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to study the behavior of contractors subject to competitive bidding and the occurrence of the winner’s curse. As such, the authors implemented a 
two-step methodology that incorporates (1) developing a general simulation model involving a population of contractors and projects using agent-
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commonly known as Reverse Auction theory. As the construction industry grows, the competition between contractors increases and 
becomes more complex [1]. Bidding for a project is a major decision that contractors make after receiving relevant information about 
such project [2]. The major challenge in competitive bidding is that the contractor needs to bid low enough to win the contract but 
still high enough to generate positive profits [3]. Contractors try to be as accurate as possible in their estimates and include a 
minimum acceptable markup to maximize their chances of winning a bid. The estimation accuracy is subjective and depends on 
multiple factors such as the estimation staff, their experience and previous knowledge of similar projects [4]. Determining the markup 
is a strategic decision made by the upper management in each company which depends upon many factors such as size of the 
company, size of the project and how desperate they are willing to win. Desperate or unexperienced contractors could end up 
submitting low bids to secure winning a certain project. This could also be another strategy implemented by claims-conscious 
contractors that plan to compensate their low bids through future change orders by filing claims during construction which will only 
harm the project objectives [5]. This is one of the major drawbacks of the lowest bid method.  Such bids might end up too low 
resulting in negative profits as the submitted bid value is less than the actual true cost of this project which is known as the winner’s 
curse. As contractors bid for projects, they become more experienced and gain a better understanding of how their next bid should be.  
In this paper, the authors attempt to simulate the competitive construction bidding market while incorporating different actions 
performed by the contractors trying to win more projects and learning from past experiences. Agent-based Modelling has been 
suggested to be suitable for the construction bidding process as it defines both elements of the project and the contractor and 
incorporates the different interactions between the two agents [6]. This model should provide a better understanding to the 
construction profession as in contractors, project owners and Departments of Transportation of how decisions are made in this 
bidding environment. 
2. Goal and Objectives 
The main goal of this paper is to provide a generic and simple simulation of the construction competitive bidding showing the 
extent to which the winner’s curse affects the status of contracting companies. The objectives of this study are to 1) understand the 
characteristics of the competitive bidding phase in construction, and 2) study the behavior of contractors subject to competitive 
bidding and the occurrence of the winner’s curse. 
3. Background 
Several researchers have previously successfully used agent-based modeling to simulate bidding. For example, Gordillo and Giret 
[7] investigated the the performance of agent-based scheduling approaches for manufacturing systems. The authors created a 
mechanism to measure the performance of agent-based scheduling approaches under key critical situations such as: dynamic 
environment, rescheduling, and priority change. Sadigh et al. [8] developed a multi-agent system for the selection of winning 
enterprises in virtual enterprise, wich is a collaboration between business partners in value chain. It can be used to forecast the 
outcomes of  auctions,  so  that  customers  can  plan  ahead  and  take  necessary action. Rahimi et al. [9] investigated consensus-
based auction bidding methods in clustered supply–demand networks, where each supplier acts as an agent in a multi-agent system. 
Koenig et al. [10] also studied the use of agent-based modeling in cooperative auctions and presented an overview of the recent 
progress in this field. 
Agent-Based modeling has also been used extensively in construction engineering and management applications, such as energy 
modeling of commercial buildings by simulating occupants as agents [11], collaboration within interorganizational networks of 
construction project teams [12], labor productivity and efficiency [13] [14], disaster management [15] [16] [17], among many other 
applications. Agent-based modeling has been used extensively to simulate bidding for construction projects, in order to model 
profitability, bidding strategies, risk attitude, the interaction between stakeholders, learning over time, and detection of market 
behavior [18] [19] [20]. This research follows the same research trend by implementing agent-based modeling to investigate bidding 
in construction projects. 
4. Methodology 
This paper presents a simulation model of the competitive construction bidding while addressing two main interacting agents 
which are projects and contractors. As such, the authors implemented a two-step methodology that incorporates (1) developing a 
general simulation model involving a population of contractors and projects using agent-based modeling for the competitive bidding 
process and (2) analyzing the results of the simulation model. All the literature review suggested using agent-based modeling for this 
kind of complex system as the main process here is interaction between different agents. After careful consideration, the authors 
chose the AnyLogic Software to be the platform for developing this model for its powerful visualization of interactions between 
agents. The main actions included in the model for simulating the construction bidding process are shown in figure 1. 
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Fig. 1. The main actions in the competitive construction bidding model  
 
The project and contractor agents are initialized with a certain population for each. The model is using synthetic data for the 
project and contractor parameters which are drawn from uniform distributions such as project cost and contractor’s capital. This is a 
generic model and all the included parameters are easily adjusted to suit different bidding environments (e.g. number of contractors 
and projects, project cost distribution, contractor’s capital distribution, contractor’s estimation accuracy). 
After a project is generated, it informs all contractors that it is calling for bids. The interested contractors start preparing their bids 
and submit their bids back to the project agent. Reverse auction theory is implemented here as the project loops the submitted bids to 
find the lowest price which then corresponds to a successful bidder. The project informs all bidders of its decision whether they won 
or lost. The successful bidder is then linked with this project to start construction till project is completed. The contractor’s profit is 
then calculated on project closure as the difference between the submitted bid and actual cost of the project. The profit is a crucial 
parameter that adds to the capital of contracting companies. On the contrary, overheads decrease the capital every time step which is 
monthly in this model. Contractors can also go bankrupt if the contractor’s capital goes below zero. 
In figure 2, the states of both project and contractor start interacting by sending messages and reacting upon such messages. The 
project agent sends messages to all contractors which is a signal with project cost. The contractors decide whether to bid on this 
project based on its capacity to handle a project of such size. 
 
Fig. 2. (a) Project State chart; (b) Contractor State chart. 
The contractor starts preparing a bid for this project based on the signal it received about the project cost. The bid value is then 
dependent upon the contractor’s estimation accuracy and markup. One of the limitations of this study is that the contractor can only 
prepare one bid at a time. The project agent stores the submitted bids with relevant information such as the interested contractor ID, 
submitted bid value and status of this bid (i.e. successful or unsuccessful). The project then loops the submitted bid values to 
determine the lowest price which ends up being the winning bidder. 
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The project informs all bidders about its decision whether they won or lost the bid. In case of losing, the contractor goes back to 
hunting state which is looking for other possible projects to bid on. Losing means that the submitted bid is out of competition. To 
have better chances in future bids, the contractor works on enhancing its estimation accuracy by learning from past experiences and 
mistakes in estimation. The contractor also decreases its markup in another attempt to maximize its future winning chances.  
In case of winning the bid, the contractor then moves to the closing state to be linked with the project start till its closure. There are 
two scenarios that can happen when a contractor wins a bid, the first is that the contractor’s bid value was higher than the actual 
project cost which results in positive profits. The other unwanted scenario is that the bid value was lower than the actual project cost 
which results in negative profits, which is also known as the winner’s curse. At that point, the contractor wants to make sure this 
situation will not happen again in future bids, so the contractor enhances its estimation accuracy and increases its markup. 
5. Simulation and Results 
The simulation of this model starts with a user-friendly interface that is easy to understand and follow as shown in figure 3. It 
describes the whole process of the simulation run of competitive construction bidding and the occurrence of the winner’s curse. The 
simulation time step is assumed to be monthly. Contractors are presented as circles while projects are presented as squares. The 
agents change their colors frequently representing the status of such agent at a certain time of the simulation run as previously shown 
in figure 2. 
 
 
Fig. 3. Simulation user-friendly interface 
 
 
The authors started the simulation with a small population of 2 contractors and 20 projects to validate that the model is working 
properly as shown in figure 4. The circles represent the contractors while the squares represent the projects and the color of each 
agent represent the state they are currently in. For example, the two contractors are in green color which means that they are in the 
bidding state for the project in lime color which means that the project is analyzing these submitted bids. 
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Fig. 4. Simulation user-friendly interface 
 
 
 Two graphs are produced as shown in figure 5 which are Project Cost vs Bid Value graph and the frequency of winner’s curse 
graph. The winner’s curse occurred two times when the submitted bids were less than the actual costs of the projects. As such, the 
model seems to be working as expected. Furthermore, the contractors are adjusting their estimation accuracy and markup as a 
reaction for bidding on projects in case of losing or the occurrence of the winner’s curse. 
  
Fig. 5. (a) Project Cost vs Bid Value; (b) Frequency of the Winner’s Curse. 
 
Figure 6 shows the simulation from the contractor’s side. It shows multiple graphs defining the contractor’s main parameters over 
time such as capital, estimation accuracy, markup and profit. After winning a bid, profit is calculated as the difference between 
submitted bid value and actual project cost. The profit is not added to the contractor’s capital until the project is completed and the 
final actual cost is computed. Sliders are also provided to change these parameters and display how these changes would affect the 
behavior and status of contractors. 
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Fig. 6. (a) Capital; (b) Profit; (c) Estimation Accuracy; (d) Markup. 
The model can handle large populations of contractors and projects. However, the model becomes more complex and harder to 
interpret but it is still behaving as expected as shown in figure 7. As the project size gets bigger, the number of interested contractors 
with enough capacity decreases. A big number of interested contractors means a more competitive environment and it becomes 
harder to win projects. If contractors cannot secure positive profits by winning projects and avoiding the winner’s curse, these 
contractors are doomed to go bankrupt eventually (i.e. turn into black colored circles). 
 
 
Fig. 7. Simulation run with 20 contractors and 100 projects. 
6. Conclusion and Future Work 
This study presented an agent-based model of the construction bidding process showing the competition between contractors on 
bidding low for projects while maintaining positive acceptable profits. The winner is sometimes cursed when the submitted bid is 
lower than the actual cost of the project being bid on. The occurrence of the winner’s curse is dependent upon the estimation accuracy 
and markup of contractors. The developed model works well in describing the competitive construction bidding process and the 
occurrence of the winner’s curse. The model has some advantages as it has a user-friendly interface that explains the whole process 
and the model is highly adjustable in terms of the parameters of both contractor and project agents. Utilization of agent-based 
modeling is efficient in representing the behavior of contractors in the bidding process. The model has some limitations such as that 
the contractor can only apply to one bid at a time, the model is using a synthetic data, and there are only two agents addressed in this 
 Amr Elsayegh  et al. / Procedia Computer Science 168 (2020) 147–153 153
A. Elsayegh; CH Dagli; IH El-adaway / Procedia Computer Science 00 (2019) 000–000 
study which are projects and contractors. The model can be enhanced by fixing the mentioned limitations and adding more agents 
such as owners and government to incorporate the full interaction of the construction market. Other influential parameters can also be 
added in each agent such as contractor’s risk estimate and the project’s procurement method. Using an actual dataset is beneficial to 
validate and calibrate the model. A game theory approach can also be implemented to see how it will affect the behavior of 
contractors in the construction bidding market. Finally, the developed model in this study should provide a better understanding to the 
construction profession as in contractors, project owners and Departments of Transportation of how decisions are made in this 
bidding environment. 
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